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COMMENTS
LIDDELL v. MISSOURI: FINANCING THE ANCILLARY
COSTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
THROUGH A COURT-ORDERED TAX INCREASE
Since Brown v. Board of Education,' the Supreme Court's command
that local school districts effect integration with "all deliberate speed" 2 has
encountered opposition through a variety of creative avoidance measures
promulgated by state and local governments.3 In response to drastic instances
of municipal resistance to court-ordered desegregation plans, 4 the Supreme
Court declared that lower courts could exercise broad equitable powers to
1. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11).
Reasoning that racial segregation of students deprives
minority children of educational opportunities equal to the opportunities afforded to white
children, the Supreme Court held that racial discrimination in public schools violates the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kansas,
347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (Brown 1); see U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, sec. 1 (no state shall
deny persons within state jurisdiction equal protection of laws). Because of local differences in
the disposition of school segregation, the Supreme Court solicited further argument on the issue
of fashioning a general decree to mandate that states desegregate public schools. Brown I, 347
U.S. at 492. In response to the recommendations of the Brown I parties and several states
appearing as amici curiae, the Supreme Court held that local school officals have primary
responsibility to desegregate schools, that district courts may exercise equitable powers to ensure
school integration proceeds expeditiously, and that district courts may retain jurisdiction over
school desegregation cases until violating school districts admit students to public schools on a
nondiscriminatory basis. Brown II,349 U.S. at 299-301.
2. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kansas, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
3. See Comment, Community Resistance to School Desegregation:Enjoining the Undefinable Class, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 111, 112-17 (1976) (explaining types of community resistance
to desegregation plans and court-ordered remedies invoked by federal courts to counter public
resistance). See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACIsM AND A MEcAN LAW, 455-97 (1973) (citing
cases and history of resistance to school integregation in South after Brown 11); Wilkinson, The
Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970:A History and Analysis, 64 VA.
L. REv. 485, 505-30 (1978) (discussing state-initiated resistance to court-ordered desegregation
plans).
4. See Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 225 (1964) (county
school district cannot summarily close public schools to avoid integration); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 9 (1958) (enjoining Arkansas governor from mobilizing state militia to prevent
black children from entering all-white high school); cf. Park View Heights Corp. v. City of
Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 1979) (overturning city ordinance that rezoned city
to prevent construction of court-ordered low income housing project); United States v. City of
Parma, Ohio, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1099-1100 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (invalidating building code
amendment that prevented construction of court-ordered integrated housing project), appeal
dismissed, 633 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1980), rehearingen banc, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S.Ct. 2308 (1982). Resistance to court-ordered desegregation erupted into civil
violence in South Boston. See Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) (district
court may place school in receivership if desegregation plan meets continued violent resistance
by students and parents), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977); see also Roberts, The Extent of
FederalJudicialEquitable Power: Receivership of South Boston High School, 12 NEw ENQ. L.
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eliminate state-perpetuated segregation in public schools. 5 Among a federal
district court's broadened equitable powers is the authority to expedite the

desegregation process by requiring a municipality to fund a desegregation
plan. 6 The authority to appropriate state funds, however, vests primarily in
the political processes of state legislatures. 7 Therefore, even though a district
court may order a state or local government to pay for a desegregation
plan s the Supreme Court has warned that a district court abrogates the

principles of federalism if the district court prescribes the specific method
by which a state or local government must comply with a desegregation plan
funding order. 9
The costs involved in implementing a desegregation plan have increased
substantially since the Supreme Court first ordered the integration of public

schools.' 0 The high cost of desegregation programs typically requires significant increases in municipal revenues." Accordingly, if a municipality's
existing tax rate is lower than the level required to secure the funds necessary
REv., 55, 74 (1976) (discussing receivership as remedy for local resistance to desegregation

plan).
5. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (Swann 1). In
Swann 1, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board failed to submit to the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina a workable desegregation plan in a timely
manner. Id. at 8. Because the school district's response to the district court's desegregation
order was unacceptable, the district court appointed an education administrator to present an
independent desegregation plan to the court. Id. The district court adopted the administrator's
plan over the plan proposed by the school board. Id. at 11. Recognizing that district courts
often encountered stiff dilatory tactics from school authorities in desegregation cases, the
Supreme Court held that the district court's solicitation of an integration plan from a source
independent of the local school board was justified. Id. at 31. Because dilatory tactics by local
school officials aggravated the effectiveness of desegregation plans, the Court further held that
district courts may exercise broad equitable powers to cure segregation when local officials fail
to act affirmatively in accordance with the mandate of Brown 1I. Id. at 15; see Brown II, 349
U.S. at 300 (federal courts may eliminate obstacles to desegregation through exercise of
appropriate equitable powers).
6. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977) (Milliken 11) (court-ordered
desegregation plans and concomitant funding orders are entirely prospective and therefore in
compliance with eleventh amendment); see also Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 813 (2d Cir.
1983) (reiterating district court's equitable power to require expenditure of funds to implement
a desegregation plan), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1907 (1984).
7. See Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 239 (1920) (taxing power of state vests in state
legislature and acts of state legislature on tax policy deserve highest presumption of constitutionality).
8. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977) (Milliken 11) (district court may
order state to fund desegregation plan prospectively).
9. Id. at 291 (district court's mandate of particular method of financing desegregation
plan exceeds federal court's equitable powers by abrogating principle of federalism); cf. San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973) (federal courts lack familiarity
and expertise necessary to manage local school system financing arrangements).
10. See Comment, Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 58 U. DET. J. U". L. 139,
155 (1980) (asserting courts must weigh costs of desegregation against benefits because costs of
desegregation programs are much higher than when Supreme Court first mandated school
desegregation).
11. See Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Liddell VII)
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for the effective implementation of a desegregation plan, a federal judge
may perceive the necessity for a local tax increase to assure compliance with
the court's desegregation order. 2 In desegregation cases, federal courts have
avoided the Supreme Court's proscription of judicial interference in the
state's legislative prerogative of determining tax policy by deferring to state
and local authorities to implement taxes necessary to fund desegregation
plans. 3 In Liddell v. Missouri,14 however, the Eighth Circuit considered
whether a federal court possesses the inherent power to increase local tax
levies to assure the funding of a comprehensive desegregation plan."I
The series of Liddell cases 6 began in 1972 in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri as a class action suit against the

(estimating cost of court-ordered capital improvements incident to desegregation plan at $127
million), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 82 (1984); see also Reaves, Eyes on Surburia,A.B.A.J., Aug.
1984, at 31 (estimating first year cost of desegregation plan that Liddell court required at $64
million).
12. See Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 779 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (recognizing
district court must be concerned with local tax rates if existing tax levels will not raise enough
revenue to fund desegregation plan), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
13. See infra notes 139-53 and accompanying text (analysis of case law limiting extent of
federal court's involvement in state affairs); see also Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 239 (1920)
(only state's clear usurpation of power will justify judicial intervention in state legislative
process).
14. 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Liddell V1), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 82
(1984).
15. Id. at 1319-23.
16. See Liddell v. Board of Educ. of St. Louis, 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1309-12 (E.D. Mo.
1979) (recounting procedural history of Liddell cases). The Eighth Circuit has reviewed the
Liddell controversy on seven occasions. See Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1302-18 (8th
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Liddell VIl) (state funded interdistrict student transfers and quality
education incentive programs are proper school desegregation remedies, and broad equitable
powers of district court in school desegregation cases include limited power to increase local
tax levies to assure funding of desegregation plan); Liddell v. Missouri, 717 F.2d 1180, 1182-84
(8th Cir. 1983) (Liddell VI) (denying stay of desegregation plan pending appeal in opposition
of plan); Liddell v. Board of Educ. of St. Louis, 677 F.2d 626, 628-29 (8th Cir.) (Liddell I)
(affirming district court allocation of funding responsibilities for desegregation plan and holding
adjacent county school districts that voluntarily participate in city school integregation plan do
not thereby admit liability or waive right to exclusion from plan), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 877
(1982); Liddell v. Board of Educ. of St. Louis, 693 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1981) (Liddell 1P)
(district court order directing school board to formulate and submit proposal for integration of
schools not appealable); Liddell v. Board of Educ. of St. Louis, 667 F.2d 643, 656-57 (8th Cir.)
(Liddell I1) (approving district court decision to implement desegregation plan and denying
stay of district court desegregation order pending filing of petition for certiorari in Supreme
Court), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981); Liddell v. Caldwell, 553 F.2d 557, 557-58 (8th Cir.
1977) (Liddell 11) (denying stay of implementation of desegregation plan pending third party
petition for intervention); Liddell v. Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 772-74 (8th Cir. 1976) (Liddell 1)
(reversing district court's denial of third party's motion to intervene in desegregation plan
formulation), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); see also Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d
1277, 1291 (8th Cir.) (holding City of St. Louis failed affirmative duty to disestablish dual
school system and requiring city to develop systemwide plan for school integration), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980).
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City Board of St. Louis, Missouri. 7 The plaintiffs, a group of black parents,
alleged that racial discrimination in St. Louis schools violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The State of Missouri
intervened as a defendant 9 upon the encouragement of the Eighth Circuit,
to assist in the formulation of a workable interdistrict desegregation plan. 20
The district court eventually held the State of Missouri and the City of St.
Louis jointly liable for the unconstitutional segregation existing in St. Louis
public schools. 2' The district court further ordered the state and local
governments to submit to the district court an effecfive desegregation proposal to alleviate the constitutional violation.22 Consequently, the plaintiffs,
along with the St. Louis City Board and twenty-three adjacent county school

17. See Liddell v. Board of Educ. of St. Louis, 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (E.D. Mo. 1979)
(noting class certification in procedural history of Liddell). The plaintiff class in Liddell
consisted of school age children and parents in the St. Louis, Missouri area. Id.
18. See id. (plaintiffs in Liddell alleged St. Louis City School Board had maintained and
perpetuated racial discrimination and segregation in St. Louis city schools in contravention of
fourteenth amendment); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. I (state may not deny equal
protection of laws to persons within state's jurisdiction); Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka,
Kansas, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment requires
state to ensure that all students have equal access to state-provided educational opportunities).
19. See Liddell v. Board of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (noting
intervention of State of Missouri in procedural history of Liddell).
20. See Liddell v. Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1976) (Liddell 1) (encouraging
State of Missouri to intervene in Liddell case). In Liddell I, the Eighth Circuit noted that
disagreements among the Liddell parties had delayed formulation of an effective desegregation
plan. Id. To assist in the expeditious resolution of the parties' disagreements over how to
implement the integration plan, the Eighth Circuit invited the State of Missouri and the United
States Department of Justice to intervene. Id.
21. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351, 359 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d
643 (8th Cir. 1981) (Liddell II1), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081, 1091 (1982). The district court in
Liddell III found the State of Missouri a primary constitutional violator because the state
constitution and state statutes perpetuated racial discrimination in St. Louis schools. Id.; see
Mo. CONST. art. IX, sec. 1(a) (1945) (repealed 1954) (providing for separate schools for black
and white children); Mo. REv. STAT. § 161.020 (1945) (repealed 1955) (providing for separate
distribution of educational funds for black and white schools); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 163.130,
164.030, 165.117, 165.297 (1945) (repealed 1957) (providing for interdistrict transfers of black
students to ensure segregation from white students). But see Liddell v. Board of Educ., 469 F.
Supp. 1304, 1314 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (Missouri legislature's prompt action to repeal racially
discriminatory education laws removed all state-promulgated obstacles to desegregation in
Missouri schools), rev'd, Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); see also Comment, St. Louis DesegregationPlan FoundInadequate:
Adams v. United States, 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1048, 1952-55 (1981) (discussion and analysis
of Eighth Circuit's holding in Adams). Racial segregation in St. Louis is the result of a complex
array of housing and demographic problems. See generally Comment, Federal Housing and
School Desegregation:InterdistrictRemedies Without Busing, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 575, 577-79
(1981) (discussing nature and causes of segregation in St. Louis) [hereinafter cited as Federal
Housing and School Desegregation].
22. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351, 359 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
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districts,21 entered into a consent agreement 24 to desegregate the city's schools. 2
The resulting agreement called for a comprehensive voluntary integration
plan using economic and educational incentives 26 to encourage student transfers .27

23. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 641-42 (8th Cir.) (Liddell P), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 877 (1982). In Liddell II, the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found
that the state was the primary constitutional violator in the segregation of St. Louis schools.
Liddell v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351, 359 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (Liddell I1l), aff'd, 667
F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081, 1091 (1982). In Liddell V, the plaintiffs
alleged that the State of Missouri had ultimate responsibility to desegregate the St. Louis City
schools, and that the state should realign St. Louis metropolitan school district boundaries to
effectuate school integration. Liddell V, 677 F.2d at 640. The State of Missouri and the counties
adjacent to St. Louis, however, alleged that since the counties were not constitutional violators,
the district court could not order the counties to comply with an interdistrict desegregation
plan. Id. at 641. In Liddell V, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that mandatory participation in the
St. Louis integration plan by non-violating county school districts would exceed the scope of
the district court's equitable powers. Id.; see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974)
(Milliken 1) (district court must tailor desegregation remedy to affect only segregated school
districts). The Eighth Circuit in Liddell V, therefore, held that the district court may not require
adjacent county school districts to participate in the St. Louis desegregation plan but that the
district court may require the State of Missouri to institute fiscal incentives to encourage
adjacent counties to assist voluntarily in the city's desegregation effort. Liddell V, 677 F.2d at
641-42. On remand from the Eighth Circuit, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri ordered the state to reimburse the adjacent county governments for costs incurred by
the adjacent county school districts' voluntarily participating in the St. Louis desegregation
plan. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 1037, 1052 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd, Liddell v.
Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1301-09 (8th Cir. 1984) (Liddell VII), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 82 (1984).
All twenty-three adjacent county school districts subsequently volunteered to participate in the
St. Louis desegregation plan. Liddell VII, 731 F.2d at 1300.
24. See Liddell v. Board of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1387-90 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (outlining
consent agreement between Liddell plaintiffs, St. Louis City Board and State of Missouri that
required St. Louis to expand school facilities, realign student allocations, and hire limited
number of new teachers with objective of eradicating segregation in St. Louis schools); see also
Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 1037, 1040 n.2 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (consent agreement is
accord among parties to desegregation lawsuit that resolves racial discrimination in schools
through voluntary settlement).
25. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp 1037, 1040 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
26. See Liddell v. Board of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 641-42 (8th Cir.) (Liddell I) (district
court may require State of Missouri to provide fiscal and educational incentives for interdistrict
transfers to effectuate desegregation of St. Louis city schools), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 877 (1982).
The Eighth Circuit in Liddell VII approved the St. Louis school desegregation plan which
allocated the costs of implementing quality education programs in St. Louis city schools between
the city and the state and required the State of Missouri to reimburse adjacent county school
districts for costs incurred in transporting county students to inner-city schools. Liddell v.
Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1297-98 (8th Cir. 1984) (Liddell VII). One of the desired effects of
the Liddell desegregation plan was to increase the quality of education in St. Louis city schools
to a level that would encourage predominately white students in outlying counties to volunteer
to attend predominately black inner-city schools. Id. at 1301-02.
27. See Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 1037, 1055-58 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (delineating
approved provisions of St. Louis City school desegregation plan).
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The Liddell parties subsequently presented the consent agreement to the
2s

district court for approval in Liddell v. Board of Education of St. Louis.
In Liddell v. Board of Education, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri determined that the consent agreement proposed

a satisfactory means of correcting segregation in St. Louis city schools. 29 The
district court, therefore, approved the desegregation plan promulgated in the
consent agreement and allocated funding responsibilities between the State
of Missouri and the City of St. Louis. 30 The district court concluded that
the high cost of implementing the Liddell desegregation plan would require
St. Louis city school districts to increase revenues substantially. 31 In addition,

the district court opined that a federal court possesses the equitable power

32
to order a municipality to raise revenues to fund a desegregation program.

The district court's holding, therefore, included an order for the City Board
to submit a bond referendum to St. Louis voters, as required by state law,33
to fund the desegregation plan.3 4 Additionally, the district court held that if
the bond referendum failed, the district court would reserve authority to
3

increase the city's tax levies to obtain revenues necessary to fund the plan.

28. Id.
29. Id. at 1047 (finding St. Louis desegregation plan outlined in consent agreement fair,
reasonable, adequate and constitutionally permissible).
30. Id. at 1055. Federal courts possess authority to allocate funding responsibilities in a
desegregation plan. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977) (district court may allocate
desegregation costs to state if state is adjudged constitutional violator); see also United States
v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 677 F.2d 1185, 1186 (7th Cir. 1982) (allocating
desegregation costs is within remedial power of district court), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 568
(1983); cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 696 (1978) (district court may impose costs of
correcting deficiencies in state prison system upon state).
31. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. at 1051. In Liddell, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri estimated that the cost of the St. Louis school desegregation
plan in the first year alone would exceed $38 million and might reach $100 million. Id. The
Liddell court further noted that the high cost of the St. Louis desegregation plan would require
the City Board to make difficult decisions regarding the raising of revenues required to fund
the plan. Id. The district court expressed concern over the St. Louis city government's expediency
in obtaining additional revenues to fund the desegregation plan by interjecting that eventually
someone must "pay the piper." Id. at 1053.
32. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. at 1052 (federal court possesses authority to
raise local taxes to pay for judgment against governmental unit).
33. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. at 1054. The State of Missouri imposes strict
constitutional debt and tax limitations on municipalities. See Mo. CoNsI. art. 10, sec. 11(b)
(1971) (limiting annual property tax levy by school districts to $1.25 per $100 assessed value);
id. sec. 11(c) (1970) (requiring consent by two-thirds of qualified electors in school district to
increase tax levies above constitutional limit); id. art. 6, sec 26(b) (1952) (requiring consent by
two-thirds of qualified electors in municipality to approve bond referendum); see also Mo.
Rev. STAT. § 164.013 (1983) (approving voter referendum, known as "Proposition C," which
directs local school boards to reduce operating levies to amount equal to fifty percent of
anticipated revenue under one-cent increase in state sales tax).
34. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. at 1056.
35. Id. After the Liddell court ordered the City Board to submit a bond referendum to
St. Louis voters to pay for the desegregation plan, the St. Louis voters failed to approve the
court-ordered bond referendum. Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984)
(Liddell VI1). The Liddell court probably anticipated the failure of the bond referendum. See
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The City of St. Louis appealed to the Eighth Circuit, however, arguing
that the district court did not have the authority to increase a municipality's
tax rate to assure funding of a court-ordered desegregation plan.3 6 In
affirming the district court's reservation of authority to increase taxes, the
Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, noted that the scope of the district court's
equitable powers to correct the wrongs of school segregation is extremely
broad.37 Furthermore, the Liddell court stated that a district court's broad
equitable powers include the authority to exercise all reasonable means of
ensuring the efficacy of a desegregation plan in the school district perpetuating racial discrimination.38 The Liddell court reasoned, therefore, that if a
municipality had failed to fund adequately a court-ordered desegregation
plan, a district court may order a tax increase to satisfy the local government's
obligation to integrate public schools. 39 The Eighth Circuit further observed
that the Supreme Court and other courts had approved judicially-ordered
tax increases in the past as reasonable means of ensuring that local govern40
ments satisfy contractual and tort liability obligations.
In addition to holding that a district court may order a tax increase to
fund a desegregation plan, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that a district
court's unqualified order to raise taxes would circumvent the traditional
integrity of the local political funding process. 41 Accordingly, the Liddell
court asserted that a federal judge should not order a tax increase to fund a
desegregation plan unless the district court has exhausted all other funding
alternatives. 42 The Eighth Circuit noted that a factual finding that a mandatory tax increase was the only available or sufficient means of funding the
Liddell integration plan did not accompany the district court's desegregation

United States v. Missouri, 388 F. Supp. 1058, 1059 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (finding that no reasonable
possibility existed for two-thirds voter approval of tax increase to fund integration plan in the
wake of desegregation order), acq., 515 F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (8th Cir. 1975).
36. Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1984) (Liddell VII).
37. Id. at 1320 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(Swann 1)); see supra note 5 (textual discussion of Swann 1).
38. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1320 (citing North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402
U.S. 43 (1971) (Swann 1i)). In North CarolinaState Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, the North Carolina
state legislature enacted an anti-busing statute that prohibited mandatory student busing to
create racial balance in public schools. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S.
43, 44 n.1 (1971) (Swann I1). The Supreme Court determined that the anti-busing statute
interfered with local school officials' affirmative duty to desegregate schools. Id. at 46. The
Swann II Court therefore held that a state may not abridge the range of remedies available to
a district court in a desegregation case by proscribing a reasonable means of achieving
integration. Id. at 46.
39. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1320 (citing Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377
U.S. 218 (1964)); see infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (textual discussion of Griffin).
40. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1322; see infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (analysis of
municipal contract and tort liability cases in which court successfully compelled municipality to
pay debt by raising taxes).
41. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1321 (district court should defer to political funding process
before considering tax increases).
42. Id. at 1322-23.
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order.4 3 The Liddell court held, therefore, that absent a finding that no other

funding alternative to raise revenues for the St. Louis desegregation plan
existed, the district court's order reserving the power to increase St. Louis
tax levies was improper. 44 The Eighth Circuit further held, however, that if
during the district court's continuing jurisdiction in the Liddell case 45 a
district judge determines that the St. Louis City Board and the Missouri
state legislature have failed to fund adequately the desegregation plan, the

district court may properly order that St. Louis city taxes be increased to a
46
level necessary for the solvency of the Liddell integration program.
Despite the Eighth Circuit's permissive holding that the district court

may order a tax increase to fund the St. Louis desegregation plan, the
Liddell dissent maintained that the district court should not have the power
to increase taxes to fund a desegregation plan, and that a district court never
should need to resort to such a tax increase.47 Asserting that the taxing power
of the states vests primarily in the state legislatures, the Liddell dissent
concluded that federal courts could not exercise the power to increase taxes,
4
nor could the federal courts interfere with local or state tax structures. 1
Additionally, the Liddell dissent stated that the Supreme Court had supported
a court-ordered tax increase to fund a desegregation plan only when the
effect of the court order was to restore tax rates to a level which the local
government previously had approved.4 9 The dissent further noted that even
43. Id. at 1323; see also Liddell v. Board of Education, 567 F. Supp. 1037, 1055-58 (E.D.
Mo. 1983) (district court's order for implementation of Liddell desegregation plan).
44. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1323.
45. See id. (remanding Liddell case to district court for additional findings on funding
issue); see also Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kansas, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown
11) (district court retains jurisdiction of desegregation case throughout violating school system's
transition from segregation to integration).
46. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1321.
47. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1332 (Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting).
48. Id. (citing Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 239 (1920)). The case of Green v. Frazier
involved a North Dakota state statute which created a state bank and an enterprise plan in
which the state government would have participated in certain private ventures deemed necessary
to the general welfare of the state citizens. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 234-38 (1920) (citing
1919 N.D. Sess. Laws 147, 148, 150-51). North Dakota taxpayers petitioned the North Dakota
Supreme Court to enjoin the state statute's implementation alleging that the measure was an
illegal exercise of a state's taxing power and a deprivation of taxpayer property without due
process. Id. at 238; see Green v. Frazier, 176 N.W. 11, 12 (N.D. 1920) (tax policy which state
legislature enacted in accordance with state law does not violate due process). The United States
Supreme Court held that federal courts could not question the validity of a state legislature's
taxing policy when the legislature promulgated the policy to nurture the general welfare of the
state. Green, 253 U.S. at 239; see also Lenhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356,
365 (1973) (federal court cannot substitute court's judgment for state legislature's discretion to
invalidate state tax law); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 86 (1940) (state legislatures possess
greatest freedem of discretion in determining local tax policies); Carmichael v. Southern Coal
Co., 301 U.S. 495, 525 (1937) (function of distributing state's tax burden vests in state
legislature).
49. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1332 (Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Griffin v.
County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964)); see infra notes 53-61 and
accompanying text (textual discussion of Griffin).
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when the court-ordered tax increase restored tax rates to a previously
approved level, the Supreme Court required the district judge to defer to
state and local officials to execute the court-ordered tax increase.50 The
Liddell dissent concluded that although a district court possesses the power
to fund a desegregation plan by entering a money judgment against a
municipality in the amount necessary to finance the court-ordered integration
program, the district court may not exercise the solely legislative prerogative
of altering tax rates."
Although the majority and dissent in Liddell disagreed on the ultimate
issue of a district court's power to increase taxes to fund a desegregation
plan, the majority and dissent agreed that taxation is a political power
outside of the traditional purview of the federal courts. 5 2 Federal courts,
however, have attempted to determine the precise circumstances under which
a tax increase would enter the purview of a federal district judge's power in
a desegregation case by variously construing the Supreme Court's holding in
Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County.5 3 In Griffin, the Prince
Edward County, Virginia, Board of Supervisors closed all public schools in
the county to prevent school integration.5 4 Furthermore, the Board of
Supervisors refused to collect property taxes which would provide funds to
keep the schools open.55 Instead, the Board of Supervisors channeled state
tax revenues to all-white private schools.5 6 The effect of the Supervisors'
actions, therefore, was to provide subsidized private education to the county's
7
white children while denying public education to the county's black children.1
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Prince Edward County Supervisors'
tax policy denied Prince Edward County students the same access to public
education as that afforded by other Virginia school districts.58 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court specified that the Prince Edward County tax policy was

50. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1332 (Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing United States
v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Ferguson Reorganized School
Dist. v. United States, 423 U.S. 951 (1975)).
51. Id. (Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting).
52. Id. at 1321, 1332 (Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting).
53. Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
54. Id. at 222; see also Allen v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 266 F.2d
507, 511 (4th Cir. 1959) (ordering Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors to make
preparations to admit children to county schools on integrated basis).
55. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 222 (noting that Prince Edward County Supervisors would not
levy taxes to operate public schools which white and black children would attend together).
56. Id. at 223 (noting that Prince Edward County Supervisors passed ordinance providing
for transfer of Virginia state educational grants to private white schools).
57. See Allen v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 198 F. Supp. 497, 503
(E.D. Va. 1961) (Prince Edward County Supervisors designed tax policy of revoking property
tax collections to perpetuate racial segregation in private county schools), rev'd on other
grounds, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
58. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 225 (denial of public education in Prince Edward County, while
other Virginia counties provided public education, constituted deprivation of equal protection of
state laws to Prince Edward County school children).
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an essential factor in depriving black school children equal access to public
education. 9 The Griffin Court concluded that the Supervisors closed the
public schools and refused to exercise the County Board's power to levy
taxes for the sole purpose of preventing racial integration of Prince Edward

County schools. 60 The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia could compel the Prince
Edward County Supervisors to exercise the County Board's power to reinstate
on
property taxes to reopen and operate the Prince Edward County schools
6
an educational basis equal to that of other Virginia school districts. '

The Supreme Court's holding in Griffin, that a district court could
compel local officials to increase taxes to reopen public schools, suggests that

a tax increase is within the bounds of a federal court's equitable powers in
desegregation cases. 62 The federal circuits, however, have interpreted the

Griffin decision in three different ways. The Seventh Circuit has narrowly
construed the Griffin decision as allowing a district court to require only
that a state legislature allocate unappropriated funds6 3 for the implementation

of a desegregation plan.64 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit would limit a
district court's intervention into a local government's tax policy by only

allowing the district court to mandate that a state spend tax receipts on a

59. Id. at 233 (Prince Edward County ordinance providing state educational grants to
private white schools constituted essential part of county supervisors' scheme to prevent
integration of public schools).
60. Id. at 231 (asserting that Prince Edward County Supervisors closed schools in county
to prevent white and colored children from going to same schools).
61. Id. at 233.
62. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1320 (asserting that Griffin holding acknowledges district
court's authority to increase taxes where state has failed to provide equal educational opportunity
to all children).
63. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 677 F.2d 1185, 1189
(7th Cir. 1982) (describing "unappropriated funds" as tax receipts which state has not allocated
for specific purpose), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 568 (1983).
64. Id. at 1190. In United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis,the State
of Indiana had implemented a statute which required the state to pay one-half of all transportation costs incident to desegregation programs in state school districts. See id. at 1186 (citing
IND. CODE § 20-8.1-6.5-1 (1974)). The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, however, found the State of Indiana a primary violator of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment for causing school segregation in the City of Indianapolis. United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 456 F. Supp. 183, 188 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
The district court subsequently allocated the full cost of the desegregation order to the State of
Indiana. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 506 F. Supp. 657, 671-74
(S.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980). The state
claimed that the district court's order for the state to pay full costs of the integration plan for
Indianapolis violated the state statute which mandated that the state pay only one-half of the
costs of any desegregation plan. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis,
677 F.2d 1185, 1187 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct 568 (1983). The Seventh Circuit
therefore held that the federal court could compel the State of Indiana to allocate unappropriated
funds in excess of one-half the cost of the desegregation plan to pay for the plan's enactment.
Id. at 1189-90.
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desegregation plan. 65 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, would forbid a district
court from exercising taxing power, but would affirm a district court's order
that a state or municipality reserve unspent tax revenues for an integration
program. 6
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Third, Fifth and Sixth Circuits have
interpreted Griffin as a stern reaction by the Supreme Court in response to
an egregious and affirmative act of segregation. 67 Accordingly, the Third,
Fifth and Sixth Circuits would limit a district court's exercise of the power
to increases taxes only to instances in which the state or local government
has affirmatively perpetuated school segregation by alternating tax policies
to frustrate a court-ordered desegregation plan. 68 The Third Circuit, therefore, would affirm a court-ordered tax increase only if the violating municipality purposely reduced or totally eliminated tax collection to prevent
integration of public schools. 69 Similarly, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits would

65. See Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 677 F.2d at 1190 (federal court's
desegregation funding order requires state legislature to support desegregation plan adequately
but does not limit legislature's prerogative to reallocate state appropriations or to raise taxes),
cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 568 (1983).
66. See id. (federal court may not instruct state legislature to finance obligations through
specific measures).
67. See Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 780 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (court may
intervene in state tax policy to assure funding of desegregation plan only in extreme cases),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980); National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir.
1977) (federal court may intervene in school financing policy only if municipality purposely
closes public schools to defeat desegregation order); see also Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820,
831 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (acknowledging egregious actions of state and county officials in
Griffin); Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817, 833 (5th Cir. 1969)
(considering Griffin as unique case of drastic resistance to court-ordered desegregation). In
Evans v. Buchanan, for example, the Delaware State Board of Education petitioned the Third
Circuit for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court for the District of Delaware to
enforce an injunction requiring the New Castle County, Delaware school district to observe a
state-enacted property tax ceiling. Evans, 582 F.2d at 774-77. New Castle County had to exceed
the tax ceiling, in violation of state law, to pay for a court-ordered desegregation plan. Id. at
775-76. Reasoning that state legislatures must determine tax policy without interference, the
Third Circuit issued the requested writ of mandamus and held that unless the State of Delaware
failed to allocate sufficient funds to operate the New Castle County schools, the district court
could not alter state tax policy. Id. at 780.
In National City Bank v. Battisti, fiscal shortfalls threatened the closing of Cleveland,
Ohio, schools. National City Bank, 581 F.2d at 566-67. The City of Cleveland operated public
schools under a desegregation plan ordered by the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio. Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 797 (N.D. Ohio 1976). The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that public school financing is the responsibility of the state alone. National City
Bank, 581 F.2d at 569. The Sixth Circuit held, therefore, that a federal court may intervene in
Cleveland school funding matters only if city officials purposefully closed the public schools to
prevent integration. Id.
68. See supra note 67 (Third, Fifth and Sixth Circuits' interpretations of tax power
implications of Griffin holding).
69. See Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 780 (3d Cir. 1978) (federal court may consider
tax increase to fund desegregation plan only if municipality purposely fails to fund school
system sufficiently), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
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only if a school district closed public schools
authorize a court-ordered 7tax
0
to avoid racial integration.
Finally, the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of Griffin in Liddell asserts
that Griffin authorizes a district court to increase local taxes above existing,
7
approved levels to meet the costs of implementing a desegregation plan.
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit would approve a court-ordered tax increase
if the district court determined that a tax increase would be the only available
or sufficient means of providing funds for a desegregation plan.7 2 The Eighth
Circuit in Liddell, therefore, approved a court-ordered tax increase only if a
district court found that no other fiscal alternatives existed to finance the
St. Louis integration program.7 3 Consequently, the federal circuits disagree
on the extent of a federal court's power to increase taxes in74desegregation
cases as conferred by the Supreme Court's holding in Griffin.
Although the circuit courts disagree on the tax power implications of
the Griffin holding, the Supreme Court and the federal circuits agree on the
authority of district courts to increase taxes in a municipality to secure
payment of a retroactive public debt.7 5 When a local government incurs a
retroactive debt due to a public contract, bond or tort liability, the municipality, as an organization of taxpayers, becomes indebted pecuniarily to
6
private individuals.7 The contracts clause of the United States Constitution"
embodies the public policy notion that a government may not misuse
70. See National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1977) (federal court
may mandate school financing measures only if local officials close public schools to avoid
racial integration); Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817, 833 (federal
court may not order school system to seek desegregation funds from particular source unless
school officials close schools to prevent integration of students).
71. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1320.
72. See id. (district court may raise local taxes if tax increase is necessary to prevent
further racial discrimination in public schools and to maintain integrated public education).
73. See id. at 1323 (district court may raise local taxes upon finding that no other fiscal
alternative to tax increase is sufficient to fund desegregation plan).
74. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text (analysis of federal circuit courts'
interpretations of Griffin holding on power of federal court to raise taxes to fund desegregation
plans).
75. See Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 666 n.ll (1974) (noting that difference between
retroactive and prospective obligations is that retroactive obligations require state to pay for
debts incurred through past activity while prospective obligations only require state to conform
future conduct to newly acquired debts); Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans,
215 U.S. 170, 175-76 (1909) (federal court may not review state action based on contracts clause
unless subsequent legislation substantially impairs prior agreement).
76. See Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 455 (1877) (municipality acts as individual,
instead of sovereign, when local government enters into contract, bond or other financial
obligation). The difference between the responsibility of a sovereign and an individual under a
financial debt is that, unlike an individual, an unfettered sovereign conceivably could eliminate
the government's pecuniary liability through legislation. Id. In the United States, however, the
contracts clause of the Constitution prevents states from ignoring contract debts through
legislation. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, sec. 10, cl. I (state may not pass law that impairs contract
obligations).
77. See supra note 76 (content of contracts clause).
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sovereign power to abandon a public debt through legislation. 7 The contracts
clause, therefore, dictates that federal and state courts prevent local govern-

ments from avoiding financial obligations by issuing orders which assure the

proper discharge of municipal debts. 79 Furthermore, courts have ordered tax

increases to guarantee payments to aggrieved creditors when local officials
have defaulted on a municipal debt. 0 Although the federal circuits agree on
the power of federal courts to order tax levies to discharge municipal debts,"'

the Eighth Circuit's majority opinion in Liddell, likening the St. Louis
desegregation funding problem to a municipal debt for purposes of courtordered taxation, is apparently unique. 82
The disparity between the Eighth Circuit's singularly broad interpreta-

tions of Griffin13 and the municipal debt cases,8 and the interpretations of

78. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 103 S.Ct. 697, 705
(1983) (municipality cannot avoid bond debt by reserving authority to declare bond contract
void); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) (contracts clause prevents
state from reducing state financial obligations); cf. Wichita Finance & Thrift Co. v. City of
Lawton, 131 F. Supp. 788, 790 (W.D. Okla. 1955) (municipality cannot avoid tort liability by
pleading that state-enforced statutory debt limitation precludes satisfaction of judgment).
79. See Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170, 181 (1909)
(federal court may issue writ of mandamus to compel local officials to collect taxes necessary
for payment of contract debt); Harshman v. Knox County, 122 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1887) (federal
court may compel collection of taxes as provided in municipal contract provision); Ralls County
Court v. United States, 105 U.S. 733, 735 (1881) (federal court may compel increase in local
taxes beyond level authorized by state law to discharge contract debt); see also Town of Flagstaff
v. Gomez, 29 Ariz. 481, -, 242 P. 1003, 1004 (1926) (state court may enjoin state from enforcing
statutory tax limits against town whose town council approved excessive tax to discharge
municipal debt); City of Long Beach v. Lisenby, 180 Cal. 52, -, 179 P. 198, 200 (1919) (city
may issue bond to satisfy municipal debt notwithstanding bond's effect of raising future taxes
above state-imposed tax limits); City of Catlettsburg v. Davis's Administrator, 262 Ky, 726, -,
91 S.W. 2d 56, 59-60 (1936) (authorizing city to raise tax levies above state-imposed tax limits
to satisfy municipal tort liability); State ex rel. Martin v. Harris, 45 N.M. 335, -, 115 P.2d 80,
83 (1941) (issuing writ of mandamus to prevent state tax commissioner from enforcing statutory
tax limitation against municipality that enacted voter-approved tax to satisfy municipal tort
liability); Raynor v. King County, 2 Wash. 2d 199, -, 97 P.2d 696, 708 (1940) (state laws
requiring expenditure of municipal funds supercede state-imposed statutory tax limitations).
80. See supra note 78 (cases in which federal or state court ordered tax increase to
discharge municipal debt).
81. See generally Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 594 (1918) (federal court may
compel tax increase to pay for public indebtedness caused by default of municipal obligation
when municipality has power to levy taxes).
82. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1322 (supporting district court's power to increase local taxes
to fund desegregation plan by relying on cases in which courts have increased taxes for payment
of retroactive municipal debts). But see Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward
County, 322 F.2d 332, 347 (4th Cir. 1963) (Bell, J., dissenting) (asserting that municipal debt
case law supports court's exercise of taxing power in desegregation cases), rev'd sub nom.
Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Virginia v. West Virginia,
246 U.S. 565, 594 (1918) (when Congress agrees to credit arrangement between states incident
to creation of new state, federal court may compel debtor state to levy taxes to discharge
indebtedness to creditor state).
83. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (Eighth Circuit's analysis of reasoning
and holding in Griffin).
84. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (Eighth Circuit's application of holdings in
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Griffin and the municipal debt cases by the other federal circuits, 5 raises
doubts concerning the Eighth Circuit's ability to authorize the district court
to raise taxes to assure the success of the Liddell desegregation plan. 6
The Griffin case, upon which the Liddell court relied heavily, 7 differs
from the Liddell case in several respects. First, while fiscal restraints beyond
the statutory control of the St. Louis City Board 88 perpetuated the racial
segregation found in St. Louis city schools in Liddell,"9 the outright closing
of all public schools to prevent integration in Griffin was a blatant and
positive discriminatory act intended to frustrate a court order to implement
a school desegregation plan. 9° Additionally, the district court in Griffin
neither promulgated nor enforced an affirmative desegregation plan 9' while
the district court in Liddell ordered a costly and comprehensive remedial
integration program. 92 Furthermore, the Griffin Court endorsed the lower
court's reinstatement of a tax levy which previously had been approved by
the Virginia legislature and the Prince Edward County Board. 93 The district
court in Liddell, however, proposed to institute a tax increase which had
municipal debt cases to desegregation funding issue in Liddell).
85. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text (federal circuits' application of Griffin
holding to desegregation funding problems); supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (federal
circuits' application of municipal debt cases to federal courts' authority to raise local taxes to
prevent contracts clause violations).
86. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1333 (Bowman, J., dissenting) (Liddell majority's authorization that district court may increase taxes to fund desegregation plan is uniquely inappropriate
under constitutional system).
87. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1320 (Griffin acknowledges federal court's authority to
impose taxes to fund desegregation plan).
88. See Mo. Ray. STAT. § 164.013 (1982) (requiring local officials to roll back local school
district operating expenses to amount equal to one-half anticipated revenues based upon onecent increase in state sales tax); see also Mo. CoNsT. art VI, sec. 26(b) (1952) (requiring twothirds voter approval to issue bonds in excess of statutory limit). See generally Thomas, Recent
Developments in Missouri: Local Government Taxation, 49 UMKC L. Rav. 491 (1981) (analysis
of statutory and constitutional fiscal limitations imposed upon local governments in Missouri).
89. See Liddell v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 1037, 1051-53 (E.D. Mo. 1983)
(acknowledging difficulty in funding Liddell plan because of high cost and state statutes limiting
local debts and taxes).
90. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267
(1977) (acknowledging that actions by Prince Edward Board of Education in Griffin were
invidious); see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 494 (1979) (Powell,
Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (acknowledging that Griffin case involved massive resistance to
desegregation by closing schools to avoid court-ordered integration); Griffin, 377 U.S. at 232
(local officials' actions in Prince Edward County, Virginia, desegregation case perpetuated racial
segregation in county schools).
91. See Allen v. County Bd. of Prince Edward County, 198 F. Supp. 497, 503 (E.D. Va.
1961) (enjoining county officials from paying grants in aid to private schools which only enrolled
white students until county supervisors reopened county public schools).
92. See Liddell v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351, 352-57 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (outlining
provisions of St. Louis remedial integration program); see also supra note 28 (indicating costs
of implementing St. Louis integration plan).
93. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 222 (noting that Prince Edward County Supervisors avoided
integration of schools by refusing to levy taxes previously used to operate schools).
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been expressly disapproved in accordance with Missouri law.9 4 Finally, the
Griffin holding would apply only to a district court exercising jurisdiction
over local officials who possess the inherent authority to levy taxes. 95 Securing
funds for the desegregation plan in Liddell, however, necessarily would

require local officials to exceed the limited taxing authority delegated by the
Missouri state government. 96 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit improperly
compared the Liddell case to the Griffin case with respect to the severity of

the fourteenth amendment equal protection violation, 97 the extent of the

court-ordered remedy, 9s and the power of local officials to effect the chosen
remedy. 99

In addition to the Eighth Circuit's inappropriate comparison of the
circumstances in the Griffin case to the circumstances in Liddell, the municipal debt cases,100 with which the Liddell court reinforced its conclusion that
the district court had the authority to order a tax increase to fund the St.
Louis desegregation plan,' 0' also differ substantially from the Liddell case.
In contrast to the municipal debt cases cited by the Eighth Circuit, the

plaintiffs in Liddell were not creditors of the City of St. Louis, nor were the
02
St. Louis taxpayers in any way pecuniarily liable to the individual plaintiffs.
Rather, the district court and the Eighth Circuit in Liddell held the St. Louis
City Board responsible to all of the St. Louis taxpayers for implementing a

94. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1300 n.5 (stating that court-ordered bond election to obtain
funds for Liddell desegregation plan failed to accrue necessary two-thirds voter approval that
Missouri Constitution requires); supra note 33 (explaining statutory and constitutional tax
limitations imposed upon Missouri municipalities).
95. See Griffin, 377 U.S. at 233 (district court may compel Prince Edward County
Supervisors to raise taxes to operate county schools in accordance with tax powers Supervisors
legitimately possess); id. at 232 (noting that county supervisors in Virginia possess specific
responsibility of levying taxes to operate public schools or aid private schools). The language in
Griffin presupposes that the local officials, whom the court would compel to raise taxes in a
desegregation case, must possess the power to levy taxes. See Comment, Local Taxes, Federal
Courts, and School Desegregationin the Proposition13 Era, 78 MicH. L. REv. 587, 594 (1980)
(asserting that federal court cannot create power to tax in municipal official who possesses no
power to tax under state law) [hereinafter cited Desegregationin the Proposition13 Era].
96. See supra note 33 (reviewing state constitutional provisions that limit tax authority of
local officials in Missouri).
97. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (differentiating between severity of
desegregation violations in Griffin and LiddelO.
98. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanyaing text (differentiating between court-ordered
desegregation remedies in Griffin and LiddelO.
99. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (differentiating between power of local
officials to levy state-approved taxes in Griffin and LiddelO.
100. See supra notes 76-78 (municipial debt cases in which federal and state courts affirmed
judicial power to raise local government taxes levies for discharging public debts).
101. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1322 (municipal debt cases support federal court's exercise
of tax authority in desegregation cases).
102. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1299 (holding State of Missouri and City of St. Louis
prospectively liable for cost of desegregation plan); cf. supra note 76 and accompanying text
(explaining that municipal debts occur when local government incurs debt to individuals).
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feasible school desegregation plan. 03 Consequently, the public policy consid-

eration manifested in the contracts clause of the Constitution that a municipality, as an organization of taxpayers, may not avoid financial obligations
to individuals'04 is inapplicable to Liddell and other desegregation cases
because the aggrieved parties are the taxpayers. 0 5 Additionally, in the

municipal debt cases, the courts ordered local governments to increase taxes
so that the local governments could discharge retroactive liabilities which the
municipalities previously had promised to pay.'
0

7 the

6

Since the desegregation

district court could not enforce
plan in Liddell was entirely prospective,
a previous promise to pay which did not exist. 0 8 Similarly, the contracts
clause, which provides the sole basis for enforcement of the court-ordered
tax increases ordered in municipal debt cases,'0 9 only provides protection to
individuals against legislation enacted subsequent to the time at which the
local government incurs liability." 0 The Missouri state legislature, however,
enacted the statutory limitations which threatened the funding of the St.
Louis desegregation plan prior to the inception of the Liddell case."' The

Eighth Circuit, therefore, incorrectly extended the narrow taxing power

103. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1299 (ordering implementation of comprehensive desegregation
plan for St. Louis city schools). School desegregation cases are unique in that the resulting
court-ordered integration plans benefit not only the plaintiffs to the suit, but also benefit every
child and affect every taxpayer in the violating municipality. See Comment, School Desegregation
and Federalism: The Court Inside the Schoolhouse Door, 5 U. DAYTON L. Rav. 77, 93-104
(1980) (analyzing effects of desegregation plan on community and effects of judicial intervention
on authority of municipality) [hereinafter cited as School Desegregationand Federalism].
104. See supranotes 76-78 and accompanying text (indicating public policy notion embodied
in contracts clause that state may not exercise sovereign power to avoid public debts to individual
parties).
105. See Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1984) (contracts clause will
not protect against state government's avoidance of contract debt if impairment of contract
affects general population instead of individual); cf. supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text
(courts have compelled municipalities to increase taxes to ensure that taxpayers fully reimburse
aggrieved creditors).
106. See supra text accompanying note 75 (contract, bond and tort liabilities constitute
retroactive debts which local government had previously promised to discharge).
107. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1300 (noting that relief outlined in Liddell desegregation plan
is entirely prospective thereby avoiding eleventh amendment problems); see also id. at 1308 n.13
(explaining eleventh amendment doctrine proscribing retroactive liability against state).
108. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S.Ct. 2296, 2304 (1983) (contracts clause protections
do not apply unless plaintiff can prove that defendant nullified previous agreement to which
defendant was beneficiary).
109. See Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170, 180 (contracts
clause provides basis for enforcing obligations in municipal contracts).
110. See id. at 175 (impairment cited in contracts clause violation must be subsequent
legislation which compromises enforcement of existing contract); J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA, J.
YouNr, CONsTITunoNAL LAW ch. 13, sec. VI, para. A.I., (2d ed. 1983) (Supreme Court never
has invalidated prospectively applied legislation based upon contracts clause violation) [hereinafter cited as J. NowA.I].
111. See supra note 33 (listing Missouri statutory and constitutional tax limitation effective
in 1971 prior to beginning of Liddell cases).
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granted to federal courts in municipal debt cases to the Liddell desegregation
case because neither the City of St. Louis nor the State of Missouri enacted,

or attempted to enact, subsequent legislation that would compromise retroactive promises to discharge municipal debts to private individuals." 2
In addition to the Liddell court's inordinately broad interpretations of
4
the court-ordered tax holdings of Griffin"3 and the municipal debt cases,"
the Eighth Circuit's decision in Liddell, affirming the district court's power

to order a tax increase to fund a desegregation plan," 5 broadly construed the
limits of the federal court's remedial powers to cure school segregation.
Although the Supreme Court granted district courts broad equitable powers
to effect desegregation of racially discriminatory school systems," 6 the Su-

preme Court limited the extent of court-ordered desegregation remedies in
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I and Milliken I1)." 7 In Bradley v. Milliken
I,"' the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and

several parents residing in Detroit instituted a class-action suit against the
State of Michigan" 9 in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan alleging that state and city policies had caused unconstitutional segregation in Detroit schools? 20 The district court determined

that the City of Detroit and the State of Michigan had perpetuated racial
segregation in Detroit schools.' 2' Reasoning that a desegregation plan limited
to the City of Detroit would not achieve the maximum possible degree of

112. See supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text (court cannot enforce municipal
obligation under contracts clause unless obligation is retroactive, accrues to benefit of individuals, and is in contravention of legislation made subsequent to obligation); see also Note, A
Process-OrientedApproach to (he Contract Clause, 89 YALE L. J. 1623, 1647-48 (1980)
(clarifying municipal obligations incurred through public and private contracts).
113. See Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (district
court may raise local taxes to open schools which county officials closed to avoid racial
integration); Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1320 (asserting that Griffin authorizes district court to increase
local taxes to operate school system without racial discrimination); supra notes 87-99 and
accompanying text (analysis of Eighth Circuit's application of Griffin court-ordered tax increase
to Liddell desegregation plan).
114. See supra notes 100-112 and accompanying text (analysis of Eighth Circuit's application of municipal debt cases' court-ordered tax holding to Liddell desegregation plan).
115. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1323.
116. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (Swann 1)
(district courts may exercise broad equitable powers to cure segregation when local officials fail
to act affirmatively to desegregate public schools).
117. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken I); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974) (Milliken 1).
118. 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (Bradley 1), aff'd, 484 F. 2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973)
(en banc), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken 1).
119. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 722 (noting that named defendant parties included Governor
of Michigan, State Attorney General, State Board of Education, State Superintendent of Public
Instruction, Board of Education of Detroit, and Detroit Superintendent of Schools).
120. Id.
121. Bradley I, 338 F.Supp. at 587-89 (state and city housing and student transportation
policies caused racial segregation in Detroit schools).
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racial integration in city schools, 122 the district court ordered a comprehensive
integration program which mandated that non-violating metropolitan school
districts assist in the Detroit desegregation effort.'2 On appeal to the Sixth
Circuit, the State of Michigan asserted that since the district court had not
found the metropolitan school districts to be constitutional violators, the
district court could not require the suburban school districts to assist in
fulfilling a desegregation order. 24 The Sixth Circuit noted, however, that the
z
State of Michigan exercised authority over all school system in the state.' 2
The Sixth Circuit, therefore, held that since the district court had adjudged
the state to be a constitutional violator, the district court could properly
order the state to establish an interdistrict desegregation plan that involved
busing students between violating and non-violating school districts within
the state.126 On review before the United States Supreme Court, however,
the Milliken I Court determined that the district court could not compel an
integrated school system to assist in the desegregation efforts of an adjacent,
segregated school district.' 27 Consequently, the Supreme Court held that a
district court exceeds the scope of the equitable powers of federal courts
when the district court orders an interdistrict desegregation remedy without
finding an interdistrict constitutional violation. 28 The Milliken I Court
122. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 916 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (Bradley fl) (asserting
that effective relief from school segregation in Detroit could not occur within city's corporate
limits). In addition to finding that the Detroit school desegregation plan had to include school
districts outside the city limits to achieve the maximum degree of racial integration, the Bradley
II court asserted that the district court possessed the duty and authority to consider a
desegregation remedy which reached beyond Detroit city limits. Id.
123. Id. at 918, aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken
1). In Bradley II, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ordered
the metropolitan school districts which the court had not found violating the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause to participate in the Detroit desegregation plan because the
court perceived that suburban school-system participation would achieve greater integration of
Detroit schools than a desegregation plan limited to the urban school districts found violating
the Constitution. Id.; cf. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33,
37 (1971) (federal courts should strive to achieve greatest possible degree of integration).
124. See Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 221 (6th Cir. 1973) (Bradley 1) (determining
whether implementation of interdistrict desegregation plan involving violating and non-violating
school districts represents proper exercise of district court's equitable authority in desegregation
case).
125. Id. at 249 (since district court determined that state had caused segregation in Detroit
schools, district court may disregard artificial school district boundaries within state jurisdiction
in fashioning desegregation plan).
126. Id. at 250 (district court may exceed school district boundaries in fashioning equitable
relief for segregation in Detroit schools).
127. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745-46 (1974) (Milliken 1) (since disparate treatment
of white and minority students occurred only in Detroit city schools, district court could not
approve desegregation plan affecting outlying school districts).
128. Id. at 746, 752 (if district court finds no interdistrict segregation violation, district
court may not order interdistrict desegregation plan). In addition to finding that a district court
may not order an interdistrict desegregation remedy in the absence of an interdistrict violation,
the Milliken I Court held that, despite the apparent flexibility of the cross-district student
transportation plan to integrate city schools, a district court only may enforce a student's right
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therefore remanded the case to the district court with orders to reformulate

the Detroit desegregation plan so that only violating school systems had to
participate in the desegregation effort. 129
In complying with the Supreme Court's order to reformulate the Detroit

desegregation plan, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
in Bradley v. Milliken III approved a new desegregation program in which
the district court's remedial order affected only the Detroit city school

districts that the district court had found to be operating in violation of the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. 30 In contrast to the desegregation plan which the Supreme Court rejected in Milliken 1,131 the new
Detroit desegregation plan included remedial education programs designed
to restore school children to the educational level the children would have
enjoyed had no segregation existed. 3 2 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the
State of Michigan asserted that since the district court determined that
Detroit schools were racially segregated, the district court must limit the
desegregation remedy to a plan that integrates public schools through reassignment of pupils.' The Sixth Circuit indicated, however, that remedial
programs are an essential part of correcting the evils of segregation. 34 The
Sixth Circuit, therefore, held that the district court properly acknowledged
the necessity for remedial educational programs in Detroit schools to reverse
effectively the educational inadequacies which black students experienced in
segregated schools. 3 In Milliken II, the Supreme Court affirmed the new
Detroit desegregation plan because the district court limited the scope of the
remedial education programs to the victims of past segregation a6 and limited
the scope of the desegregation responsibilities to the segregated school
system. 3 7 Consequently, the Milliken II Court concluded that since the new
to attend an integrated school in the school district where the student resides. Id. at 746.
129. Id. at 753.
130. Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (Bradley III)
(guidelines for Detroit desegregation plan must maximize integrative effect in Detroit schools
given practicalities of situation within geographical boundaries of city).
131. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 752 (rejecting interdistrict desegregation remedy for Detroit
schools).
132. See Bradley III, 402 F. Supp. at 1132-45 (outlining comprehensive plan for desegregation of Detroit city schools including remedial education programs for victims of past
segregation).
133. Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 236 (6th Cir. 1976) (Bradley II1) (State of Michigan
attacked new Detroit desegregation plan on ground that district court exceeded authority by
ordering remedial educational components for which state had to pay one-half of total cost).
134. Id. at 241 (remedial education components are integral to desegregation plan because
one of desegregation plan's goals is to remedy undesirable effects of segregation on academic
achievement of black students).
135. Id. at 241-42 (district court's inclusion of remedial education programs in desegregation
plan was proper because educational component of Detroit plan directly addressed reversal of
harmful effects of segregation in Detroit schools).
136. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (Milliken 11) (district court must fashion
desegregation plan to remedy segregative conditions that offend Constitution).
137. Id. at 281-82 (Detroit desegregation plan remedial education program was within
limitations of federal judicial authority because district court tailored remedy to cure segregative
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court-ordered desegregation remedy for Detroit attacked only the segregative

condition and did not interfere with the autonomy of independent, integrated
school systems, the district court's order was within the equitable powers of
the federal courts and within the scope of the constitutional violation. 3
In addition to authorizing the remedial education provisions of the
Detroit desegregation plan, the Milliken II Court noted that the Supreme

Court never had considered the limits to a district court's equitable powers

in restoring victims of past segregation. 13 9 Consequently, the Milliken I1

Court promulgated three limiting factors to which district courts must adhere
in fashioning a desegregation decree. First, reasoning that the court's order
should affect only the school districts found to have violated the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause by operating a segregated school system,
the Supreme Court held that the district court's remedy must reflect the
nature and scope of the constitutional violation. 40 Second, the Supreme
Court asserted that a court should limit the extent of a desegregation plan
to reversing the evil effects of racial segregation in schools so that complain-

ing parties do not view a school desegregation case as an opportunity to
change local government policies in areas other than those affecting racial
discrimination in schools.' 4' The Milliken 11 Court, therefore, held that a
desegregation remedy must restore victims of segregation to the position the
victims would have enjoyed in the absence of the constitutional violation.

42

Finally, the Supreme Court reemphasized the need for local control over
education 43 by holding that district courts must defer to municipal authorities
for solving problems related to enacting desegregation plans.'" The Supreme

Court concluded the Milliken 11 opinion by indicating that if a district court's
desegregation remedy exceeds the scope of the constitutional violation,

changes local government policies in areas unrelated to the eradication of
condition in violating school system without imposing responsibilities upon school districts that
had not violated Constitution).
138. Id. at 287-88 (district court did not abuse equity powers in Detroit desegregation case
by ordering remedial education program because pupil reassignment alone cannot cure evils of
segregation). In addition to finding that a remedial education program was a valid component
of the Detroit desegregation plan, the Supreme Court in Milliken II noted that the remedial
education program did not violate the role of local officials in maintaining authority over public
education. Id. at 288.
139. Id. at 279.
140. Id. at 280 (desegregation order must address the segregative condition that district
court finds violated Constitution).
141. Id. at 280 (desegregation order must restore victims of segregation to educational
status victims would have enjoyed in absence of segregation); see also id. at 286 n.17 (district
court may not order remedial educational program unless court finds that racially discriminatory
policies in violation of Constitution caused condition that remedial program will correct).
142. Id. at 280.
143. Id. at 280-81 (desegregation plan must respect local officials' authority to manage
affairs related to public education); see Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kansas, 349 U.S.
294, 299 (1955) (Brown I1) (local officials possess primary responsibility in solving desegregation
problems).
144. Milliken H1, 433 U.S. at 281.
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segregation in the public schools, or unnecessarily intervenes into the struc-

ture and policies of a local government found to be a constitutional violator,
the district court oversteps the limits of the federal court's equitable powers
45

in desegregation cases.
In addition to proscribing unnecessary judicial interference with the
autonomy of local governments in implementing a court-ordered desegregation plan, the third Milliken I limiting factor specifically prohibits federal

courts from mandating a particular means of securing state and local funding
for a desegregation plan.146 The Supreme Court's ruling in Milliken II,
therefore, emphatically declares that a federal district court exceeds its

authority by circumventing a municipality's discretion over the creation and
implementation of desegregation funding schemes. 47 A district court may
approve a desegregation plan, 48 order the plan's implementation, 149 and even
order the local government to allocate funds to pay for the plan. 50 The
federal court, however, exceeds the equitable limits imposed in Milliken II,
and abrogates the principles of federalism,'-' by dictating the means of
obtaining the funds necessary to implement the desegregation plan. 52 Abso-

lute deference to state and local officials for integration program funding
decisions is therefore a notion wholly consistent with the broad equitable
powers exercised by the federal courts in desegregation cases.

3

145. Id. at 291 (district court's desegregation order falls within limits of federal judicial
equitable powers if court's order enforces fourteenth amendment without jeopardizing integrity
of local and state government); accord Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 305-06 (1976) (district
court may not coerce or restructure local government to restrict municipality's rights and powers
under state law).
146. See Milliken I1, 433 U.S. at 291 (district court abrogates principles of federalism by
mandating particular means of financing desegregation plan); see also Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l
Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981) (federal court must drastically limit interference with important
local concern of collecting taxes).
147. See Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 291 (federal court's restructuring of local government or
enjoining particular desegregation funding scheme would jeopardize integrity of local government).
148. See Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kansas, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown
I/) (federal courts possess authority to determine adequacy of proposed desegregation plan).
149. See id. (federal courts will issue orders necessary to implement approved desegregation
plans).
150. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 289-90 (federal court may order state or municipality to
provide funds prospectively to eliminate conditions caused by school desegregation); Arthur v.
Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 813 (2d Cir. 1983) (reasserting district court's power to order government
units to fund desegregation plan); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis,
677 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1982) (ordering constitutional wrongdoer to remedy constitutional
violation is within federal court's authority), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 568 (1983).
151. See J. NowAx, supra note 110, at ch. 3, sec. I (federalism contemplates that state
governments act as sovereigns, limited only by those powers that states have delegated to United
States government in Constitution).
152. See Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 291 (district court abrogates principles of federalism by
mandating specific means of financing school desegregation plan).
153. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 677 F.2d 1185, 1190
(7th Cir. 1982) (federal court exceeds equitable powers by instructing state legislature on how
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Although the Eighth Circuit in Liddell recognized the need to defer to
local authorities for funding decisions related to the St. Louis desegregation

plan,1 4 the Liddell court asserted that the district court's power to increase
taxes would be necessary to ensure the desegregation plan's efficacy if the
St. Louis City Board defaulted on the city's obligation to appropriate funds
for the plan. 55 Taxation and appropriation, however, are necessary but
independent procedures that are integral to the process of spending public
funds on municipal programs.1 6 A government's tax policies are not necessarily premised upon the same considerations as a government's appropria-

tion policies. 57 Therefore, a change in a government's tax system will not
ensure a change in the government's system of spending public funds.
Accordingly, a court-ordered tax increase will not ensure the solvency of a
desegregation plan unless the court accompanies the tax increase with a
concomitant order to allocate the revenues obtained from the tax increase to
the desegregation plan. In Liddell, however, the Eighth Circuit conditioned

the district court's exercise of the power to increase taxes in St. Louis upon
a failure of the Missouri state legislature and the City Board to allocate
revenues for the Liddell desegregation plan.'58 A court-ordered tax increase
certainly would raise additional revenues for the City of St. Louis, but since
the district court must acknowledge, rather than alleviate, the local government's refusal to appropriate funds for the desegregation plan before ordering increased taxes, the court still has no assurances that the City Board will
allocate the new revenues toward the desegregation plan. 5 9 Consequently,

since the district court failed to enforce the order allocating funds for the
to discharge financial obligations incurred from desegregation decree), ceit. denied, 103 S. Ct.
568 (1983).
154. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1321 (district court must defer to political funding process
before exploring more intrusive means of funding local government's desegregation responsibilities).
155. Id.
156. See B. HERBER, MODERN PUBLIc FINANcE 94-95 (4th ed. 1979) (most taxes flow into

government's general treasure from which legislative institution independently directs expenditures of revenues).
157. See id. at 95 (since taxes have regulatory effect, legislature frequently imposes taxes
without intent to allocate proceeds to particular programs or services).
158. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1323 (district court may enter judgment sufficient to raise
funds for St. Louis desegregation plan upon failure of St. Louis City Board and State of
Missouri to find alternative source of funds).
159. See id. (district court may order local tax increase to fund St. Louis desegregation
plan if, after finding no reasonable funding alternatives exist, district court determines that City
Board is unable to finance desegregation plan with city resources). Although the Eighth Circuit
in Liddell directs the district court to determine if the St. Louis City Board possesses sufficient
resources to fund the St. Louis desegregation plan before initiating a tax increase, the Eighth
Circuit's opinion is devoid of guidelines by which the district court is to analyze the city's
budget. Id. Since the Liddell court delineates no provisions for evaluating the City Board's
existing allocations in non-educational areas, the district court possesses no tool with which to
evaluate the City Board's allocations after a court-ordered tax increase. See Liddel v. Board of
Educ. of St. Louis, 677 F.2d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 1982) (Liddell P) (district court is ill-equipped
to determine fair, reasonable and actual desegregation costs), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 877 (1982).
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Liddell desegregation plan, the court will not necessarily succeed in funding
the Liddell plan by ordering a local tax increase. 60

Rather than ordering a local tax increase, the district court in Liddell
would have achieved greater success in funding the St. Louis desegregation
plan if the district court had enforced rigidly its original order compelling

local officials to allocate funds for the desegregation plan. District courts
possess the equitable power to require that a local government allocate funds

for a desegregation plan.' 6' In Liddell, therefore, as in any desegregation

case in which existing municipal revenues exceed the anticipated cost of the
desegregation plan, a court-ordered allocation of municipal funds will ensure
adequately the solvency of the plan because the City of St. Louis would have
to allocate existing tax revenues to meet the costs of the desegregation plan
before the City Board spends the revenues on other municipal services.1 62

Accordingly, a tax increase may still be necessary to provide adequate
revenues for other municipal functions, but because the district court would
have ensured the desegregation plan's success through a mandatory allocation
order, a court-orderedtax increase would not have been necessary.' 63 Consequently, since a court-ordered tax increase would not have guaranteed the
solvency of the St. Louis desegregation plan, the Eighth Circuit, by approving

the district court's power to increase taxes in Liddell, interfered needlessly
with the autonomy of the St. Louis city government and exceeded the scope

Consequently, after the district court orders a tax increase to pay for the desegregation plan,
the district court accrues no new powers to ensure that the City Board allocates the revenues
realized from the tax increase on the desegregation plan. Id.
160. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1322.
161. See Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 779-80 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (district court
may enforce monetary judgment against violating municipality by requiring local officials to
allocate existing revenues to pay for desegregation plan), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980). In
addition to holding that district court may compel funding of a desegregation plan out of a
municipality's existing revenues, the Third Circuit in Evans v. Buchanan asserted that local
officials would retain discretion and control over funding policies elsewhere in the municipal
budget because local officials may or may not decide to raise taxes for maintenance of existing
municipal services that the desegregation plan preempted. Id. at 780; see also Desegregationin
the Proposition13 Era,supra note 95, at 595-606 (delineating desegregation funding alternative
to court-ordered taxation).
162. See Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 780 (3d Cir. 1978) (district court may resort
to alternative funding orders only if violating municipality's accrued revenues are insufficient
to implement desegregation plan and operate schools), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980). The
St. Louis school desegregation plan in Liddell will cost the City Board approximately $15
million in the first year. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1333. St. Louis city revenue intake, however, is
over $400 million per year. U.S. DEPT. OF ComimtcE, CouNTY AND Crry DATA BooK 746-47
(1983). Since sufficient revenues exist to fund the Liddell desegregation plan, no court-ordered
tax increase would be necessary. Cf. Evans, 582 F.2d at 780 (district court may not raise current
local budget if current revenues are adequate to fund desegregation plan).
163. See Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 780 (3d Cir. 1978) (after district court orders
municipality to allocate existing revenues to fund desegregation plan, no tax increase is necessary
unless local officials choose to increase taxes to maintain services from which desegregation
funds originated), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
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of federal equitable powers in desegregation cases as limited by Milliken
IL.64
Even without the protection of the remedial limits upon a federal court's

equitable powers which the Supreme Court imposed in Milliken II, a federal
court dangerously threatens the concept of separation of powers' 6 by ordering or affirming a court-ordered tax incident to any controversy. The Liddell

dissent correctly noted that a state derives taxing power from the state's
citizenry and that a state's power to tax vests in the state legislature.'6

Therefore, since taxation is not a judicial function, a court's exercise of
taxing power manifestly violates the concept of separation of powers.

67

The

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and the
Eighth Circuit have acknowledged in prior cases that a federal court exceeds

judicial province by altering a state's tax policy.

68

Furthermore, the Supreme

Court has held that each branch of government must resist the tendency to
invade the powers of another branch, even if such a restriction compromises

a branch's accomplishment of its desired objectives. 6 9 The three branches of
government must remain interdependent rather than independent under the
tripartite system. 70 Therefore, when one branch requires the exertion of
164. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977) (Milliken I1) (district court may not
jeopardize integrity of local government by dictating method of funding desegregation plan);
Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1332 (Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting) (federal courts go too far by
dictating procedure by which local government must fund desegregation plan); supra notes 14653 and accompanying text (explaining that Milliken 11 demands that federal courts minimize
judicial intervention in funding policies of local government); see also Liddell v. Board of
Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 631 (8th Cir.) (Liddell P) (district judge should defer to local officials for
financing policy in desegregation plans because federal court is ill-equipped to make funding
determinations based upon complex considerations involved), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 877 (1982);
National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1977) (school financing is clearly
matter for state and local government to resolve); see generally Federal Housing and School
Desegregation,supra note 21, at 600-02 (comparing desegregation problems of Liddell to those
encountered in Milliken).
165. See J. NowAK, supra note 110, at ch. 3, sec. V (separation of powers doctrine
contemplates systematic prevention of consolidating executive, judicial and legislative powers in
one branch or instrumentality of government).
166. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1332 (Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting).
167. See Taylor v. Secor, 92 U.S. 575, 615 (1875) (State Railroad Tax Cases) (exercise of
taxing powers by legislative officials is beyond power of courts to control); Heine v. The Levee
Comm'rs, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 655, 660-61 (1873) (court-ordered tax would invade legislative
function of state and compliance with court-ordered tax would involve unforeseeable, extrajudicial consequences).
168. See Johnson v. Riverland Levee Dist., 117 F.2d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 1941) (affirming
finding by District Court for Eastern District of Missouri that lack of federal court's power to
levy taxes is manifest and indisputable).
169. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2788 (1983)
(concept of separation of powers requires that each branch resist temptations to exercise another
branch's function).
170. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-23 (1976) (although United States Constitution
does not envisage total separation of powers, triparte government requires interdependence of
branches rather than independence of branches to obtain governmental goals); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952) (Constitution requires that lawmaking
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another branch's power to achieve desired objectives, the distressed branch
must solicit the assistance of the competent branch to exercise those powers
rather than exercise those powers itself.' 7 ' In particular, the judicial branch
must always depend upon the executive and legislative branches to accomplish
judicial goals. 72 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit in Liddell abrogated the
principle of separation of powers by affirming a district court's power to
adjudicate, legislate and execute a local tax increase independent of legislative
7

and executive participation. 1
Federalism and the traditional concept of local control over education'7 4
complicate a district court's ability to enforce the funding of a court-ordered
desegregation plan. 75 The Supreme Court historically has recognized the
difficulty in compelling state and local governments to finance diligently the
ancillary costs of complying with a federal court's judgment. 76 A federal

power vests in Congress alone and one branch of government may not determine and execute
policy); Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (government branch commits
breach of fundamental law if branch assumes powers reserved expressly for coordinate branch).
171. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1976) (if one branch of government requires
power of another branch to achieve government objective, branch requiring assistance must
seek augmentation from branch that possesses required power) (citing Hampton & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1927)); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587
(1952) (if branch possesses authority to perform some act, branch's power to perform act must
derive from Constitution).
172. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1966); see Merriwether
v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 518 (1880) (federal court cannot seize power of state legislature to
raise taxes but federal court may enforce monetary liabilities through executive agencies); see
also United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 677 F.2d 1185, 1192 (7th Cir.
1982) (Posner, J., dissenting) (if state legislature and executive fall to perform court-ordered
duty to assist federal court in enforcing judgment, limit of court's inherent equitable powers is
to cite appropriate state officials for contempt).
173. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1323 (district court possesses authority in desegregation case
to determine desegregation funding requirements and to issue order to raise and collect taxes to
satisfy requirements); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588
(1952) (single branch of government may not determine and execute policy); Tan FEDmERALsT
No. 47, at 338 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1966) (judicial exercise of legislative functions
exposes government policy to arbitrary control, and judicial exercise of executive functions
equates to oppression of people that government serves).
174. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) (Milliken 1) (local control over
education is deeply rooted tradition that is essential to recognition of public concerns and
nurturing of community support for public school policy); School DesegregationandFederalism,
supra note 103, at 93 (basis for local control over education lies in court's reluctance to intrude
on academic freedom of educational institutions and in maintenance of parental discretion over
decisions affecting education of children). See generally National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976) (federal government must resist legislating in areas traditionally reserved
for state and local governments).
175. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (Swann 1)
(district court must carefully balance countervailing individual and collective interests in devising
fair and effective desegregation remedy).
176. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 320-21 (1904) (acknowledging
federal court's difficult task in shaping constitutional, fair and effective monetary judgment
against state government).
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court, nevertheless, is obliged to search for effective judicial tactics that
preserve the community's respect for the federal judiciary and nurture a level
of local cooperation beneficial to the administration of an integration
program. 77 A federal court's resort to taxing powers not only is unnecessary,

but such "taxation without representation''178 is certain to antagonize the
tension between local citizens and the federal courts. 79 The Eighth Circuit,

therefore, further complicated the district court's ability to arrive at an
amicable solution to the racial problems in St. Louis schools by affirming a
court-ordered tax increase in Liddell.S0
To reduce the inherent difficulties in achieving school integration and to

secure a cooperative and effective solution to desegregation funding problems, a federal court absolutely should avoid ordering a controversial tax

increase.'' Specifically, the district court should determine the root cause of
the fiscal shortfall and issue an appropriate order to alleviate the funding

problem at its source. 8 2 In Liddell, state statutory and constitutional tax
limitations 8 3 precluded local officials from adequately funding the courtordered integration plan. ' The source of the funding obstacle that prevented
expeditious financing of the Liddell plan, therefore, was not the St. Louis
city government but the State of Missouri. 8 5 By approving extensive tax

177. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971) (Swann 1)
(district judge must work together with school authorities in achieving desegregation); Morgan
v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 618, 620 (1st Cir. 1975) (school officials must work with court to enhance
effectiveness of desegregation plan); see also School Desegregationand Federalism, supra note
103, at 104 (local participation in formulating desegregation remedy instills community cooperation).
178. See Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 777 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (citing American
colonist's description of tyranny by which Great Britain ruled over American colonies), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 416, 427
(1819) (power to tax also includes power to destroy).
179. See TEE FEDERAIST No. 46, at 333 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1966) (unwarranted
or unpopular federal interventions into state government operations will aggravate public
demeanor).
180. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1323.
181. See id. at 1332 (Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting) (Liddell majority exceeded
power of federal courts by dictating particular tax policy to raise funds for St. Louis desegregation plan); cf. Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (district courts shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrain state government's assessment, levy or collection of tax where state court
can grant plain, speedy, and efficient remedy).
182. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (explaining that allocation of funds
rather than amount of funds is ultimate obstacle in typical school desegregation case).
183. See supra note 21 (delineating Missouri state constitutional and statutory limitations
on local government taxing powers).
184. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1300.
185. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1300 n.5 (bond issue election required for municipal
indebtedness to pay for desegregation plan failed to accrue necessary two-thirds voter approval);
id. at 1323 n.21 (operating levy referendum required for increase in local taxes to pay for
additional services failed); supra note 95 and accompanying text (court order compelling St.
Louis officials to raise taxes would be nugatory since St. Louis officials have no inherent power
to increase local taxes).
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limitations, the Missouri legislature and voters necessarily accepted the fiscal
constraints that local governments might experience statewide due to lack of
adequate revenues. 8 6 Therefore, since the district court declared that the
State of Missouri had violated the Constitution by contributing to segregation
in St. Louis schools,'8 the Missouri state legislature and voters should have
exercised the decisive role in reconciling the state's tax limitation provisions
with the financial demands of the St. Louis school integration plan.
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit and the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri might have considered placing the entire
funding responsibility for the Liddell desegregation plan upon the Missouri
state government, with an option to delegate the originally-ordered financial
burden of St. Louis to the City Board on the state's own initiative. 8 Under
a desegregation funding plan which defers entirely to state discretion, the
legislature and the voters of Missouri would have to either direct the state
treasury to absorb the total cost of curing St. Louis's segregation, or release
the state sovereign's grip on the St. Louis City Board's taxing power by
enacting a special exception to statutory and constitutional tax limitations. 8 9
Upon promulgating an order to the State of Missouri either to fund the
entire Liddell desegregation plan from state revenues, or to legislate an
exception to state tax limitations that permits the St. Louis City Board
legitimately to raise tax levies, the district court would have assured funding
of the remedial integration plan because the court's power to enforce either
option is unquestionable.190
Placing the funding decision squarely on the shoulders of the Missouri
state government has several advantages over the Eighth Circuit's decision
to permit the district court to exercise limited taxing authority in Liddell. In
Milliken II, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of district
judges to order state officials to appropriate funds for a court-ordered
desegregation plan.' 9' Placing the burden of decision to select the funding
186. See Thomas, supra note 88, at 494-95 (1981) (Missouri state tax limitation statutes
that require voter approval for local tax increases impose severe constraints upon local
governments in Missouri).
187. See Liddell v. Board of Educ. of St. Louis, 491 F. Supp. 351, 359-60 (E.D. Mo.
1980) (State of Missouri abdicated state's responsibility of ensuring operation of constitutionally
sufficient school systems), aff'd, 677 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1981) (Liddell II1), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1081 (1982).
188. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1300 (St. Louis must pay one-half cost of quality education
programs in inner-city schools and one-half cost of city school plant capital improvements in
accordance with original settlement agreement among parties to Liddell litigation).
189. See Mo. CoNsT. art. XII, sec. 2(a) (1945) (authorizing legislative initiation of amendment to state constitution at any time). Since the Missouri state legislature can pass state law
or initiate process to amend the state constitution at any time, no obstacle exists at state level
that would prevent a change in laws to permit the City Board of St. Louis to levy taxes necessary
to pay for the Liddell desegregation plan. Id.
190. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977) (Milliken 11) (federal courts
possess power to order state officials to appropriate funds for desegregation plan regardless of
financial strain placed upon state treasury).
191. Id.
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therefore, permits the court to exercise

several uncontroverted powers to alleviate further resistance to funding the
Liddell integration plan. 193 First, the federal court may issue an injunction
in the nature of mandamus compelling the state executive to enforce the
state legislature's funding decision. 94 Next, the court could award the City
of St. Louis monetary damages from the state treasury by finding the state

liable as a constitutional tortfeasor.

95

In addition, the court may compel the

Missouri State Comptroller, though not a party to the Liddell case, to issue

a warrant in the cost of the judgment against the state treasury.

96

Finally,

as a last resort, the court may coerce state officials to comply with the

district court's funding order through indefinite imprisonment by citing state
97
officials for contempt.
Similarly, if the state legislature decides to delegate a portion of the
desegregation funding responsibility to the City of St. Louis by granting the
City Board limited taxing authority, the district court readily could enforce
funding of the Liddell integration plan at the local level. 98 Accordingly, the

district court may compel local officials to fund the St. Louis desegregation
192. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (suggesting that court place entire
financial burden of Liddell desegregation plan on State of Missouri).
193. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1970) (Milliken I) (federal court may
enforce prospective remedial desegregation costs against state).
194. See Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 776-77 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (establishment
of financial arrangements for desegregation plan warrants consideration of mandamus as tool
to enforce court decree), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980); State ex rel. S.S. Kresge Co. v.
Howard, 357 Mo. 302, -, 208 S.W. 2d 247, 249 (1947) (en banc) (since all of Missouri state
comptroller's duties are purely ministerial, court may compel state comptroller to perform duties
through writ of mandamus); see also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158-60 (1908) (federal
court may issue mandamus or otherwise compel state executive to conform enforcement of state
laws to constitutional standards); Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 518 (1881) (federal
court may compel officials to collect taxes approved by state legislature); cf. Work v. United
States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925) (federal court may use mandamus power only to
compel government officials to perform ministerial duties).
195. See Fortin v. Commissioner of Mass. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 797 n.
10 (1st Cir. 1982) (fine against state for state's failure to act may be coercive in nature but as
long as federal court enforces fine prospectively and state can avoid fine by acting appropriately
no eleventh amendment problems result).
196. See Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1982) (federal court may
compel state comptroller to issue warrant to state treasurer to enforce monetary award against
state); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1271 (5th Cir. 1980) (federal court may order state
auditor to issue warrant upon state treasury to satisfy monetary judgment against state); see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 70 (if party to suit refuses to obey court order, federal court may order
another party to perform court-ordered action); Mo. REv. STAT. § 33.160 (1959) (comptroller
issues warrant for discharge of funds from Missouri state treasury).
197. See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 618, 619 (1st Cir. 1975) (citing members of South
Boston school committee for contempt for failure to comply with court's order to submit
desegregation proposal); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 677 F.2d
1185, 1192 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J. dissenting) (contempt is only means of enforcing federal
court's order against individuals who ignore court's decree); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 70 (federal
court may find party who disobeys court-order in contempt).
198. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (Swann 1)
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plan by issuing an injunction in the nature of mandamus, 99 or, as a last
resort, cite local officials for contempt. 200 Consequently, by initially vesting
the entire Liddell desegregation funding decision in the Missouri state legislature, the district court accrues the distinct advantage of assuring the
solvency of the St. Louis school desegregation plan through ordinary judicial

means rather than through encroachments into the state's tax structure. 20'
Furthermore, by avoiding involvement in the state and local governments'

tax structures through a court-ordered tax, the district court preserves an
atmosphere socially receptive to the implementation of a desegregation plan

in the community whose schools are racially segregated. 202

Other federal circuits have recognized that by allowing the state govern-

ment to resolve fiscal problems encountered while carrying out a federal
court's desegregation order, the district court avoids placing the segregated

municipality into a situation where the local government must confront state
law to provide adequate funding for the desegregation plan.30 By attacking
the Liddell funding problem at the local level, however, the district court
and the Eighth Circuit frustrated local cooperation with the desegregation

plan2 " and failed to address the root cause of the desegregation plan's

(failure of local officials to eliminate school segregation justifies federal court's intervention
and exercise of equitable powers to achieve desegregation).
199. See Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (court
may compel local officials to exercise powers to raise revenues necessary to operate school
system without racial segregation).
200. See supranotes 196-97 (citing cases supporting federal court's use of contempt citations
in desegregation case for coercing appropriate actions by state and local officials).
201. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 677 F.2d 1185, 1192
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting) (federal court's only legitimate last resort remedy for
disobedience of court order is to cite disobedient party for contempt). But cf. Liddell v. Board
of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 1037, 1052 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (implying that court would rather encroach
upon state legislature's function by promulgating court-ordered tax increase than exercise
irrefutable judicial power by citing officials for contempt in failing to raise funds for desegregation plan).
202. See School Desegregationand Federalism, supra note 103, at 104 (1980) (explaining
that retention of local level decision making in desegregation plan instills cooperation and
improves community receptiveness to school integration).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 677 F.2d 1185,
1187-90 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding district court's order that funds used for desegregation plan
must not come from existing state education funds but cautioning that no other judicial
intervention into state legislative process is appropriate), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct 568 (1983);
Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 777-79 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (federal court must accord
deference to state legislature in determining tax requirements incident to desegregation plan),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980); National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir.
1977) (school financing is exclusively matter of state responsibility through state's appropriate
executive, legislative and judicial branches); Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States,
415 F.2d 817, 833 (5th Cir. 1969) (reversing district court order compelling school system to
apply federal aid to help fund desegregation plan because local officials must resolve all financial
problems related to desegregation of schools).
204. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text (direct judicial intervention into local
tax policy is certain to instigate community antagonism against federal court).
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financial obstacle at the state level. 2 5 Had the Eighth Circuit required the
Missouri state government to resolve the entire Liddell financial problem,
St. Louis would have enjoyed a degree of control over the desegregation
plan which only the Missouri state legislature could have restricted. 206 Accordingly, a court order compelling the state legislature or the St. Louis City
Board to allocate funds necessary to implement the Liddell desegregation
plan would have guaranteed the financial success of the plan without
27
exercising an unwarranted court-ordered tax increase. 0
A federal court possesses many alternatives to increasing tax levies when
a municipality or state inadequately funds a desegregation plan. For example,
the federal court may substitute an expedient court-promulgated desegregation plan for the desegregation plan which the parties of the lawsuit proposed
in the consent agreement. 208 The federal court also may order the United
States Treasury to escrow federal revenue sharing funds in an amount
necessary to finance a municipality's fiscal responsibility under a desegregation plan. 209 Indeed, since federal courts possess broad equitable powers in
fashioning desegregation remedies, 210 only the immutable principles of federalism, separation of powers, and local control over education impose
limitations on a federal court's creativity in formulating an effective integration plan. 21' By allowing the district judge to increase local taxes to pay for
a desegregation plan, however, the Eighth Circuit in Liddell gave federal
courts the final necessary ingredient to exercise unchecked power to effect
212
school desegregation.
205. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text (root cause of funding problems in
Liddell case originated in state-promulgated tax limitations rather than local officials' resistance
to finance desegregation plan); Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1300 n.5 (state referendum requirement
prevents St. Louis City Board from instituting local tax or bond issue without two-thirds voter
approval).
206. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (delineating legitimate and accordant
scheme of allocating desegregation funding responsibility by vesting entire financial burden
upon state).
207. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (federal court enforcement of order
allocating desegregation costs ultimately ensures funding of desegregation plan by ordering
municipality or state to pay for integration program before paying for existing services).
208. See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 618, 620 (1st Cir. 1975) (although locally-proposed
desegregation plan is desirable, dilatory response by local officials may warrant substitution
of desegregation plan created by federal court).
209. See Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Florida, 698 F.2d 1181, 1186 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (federal
court may impound federal revenue sharing funds for purpose of correcting unconstitutional'
racial disparities in community).
210. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (Sivann 1)
(if local government falls to discharge adequately court-ordered responsibility to desegregate
schools, federal court possesses broad equitable powers to effect expeditious integration).
211. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text (principle of federalism restricts scope
of judicial power in desegregation cases); supra notes 164-78 and accompanying text (principles
of separation of powers and local control over education restrict scope of judicial power in
desegregation cases).
212. Cf. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293 (1976) (federal court's remedial powers to
restructure operations and policies of local government in desegregation case is not plenary).
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The Supreme Court has mandated that the disestablishment of segregated
21 3
school systems throughout the United States must be prompt and effective.
Federal courts must therefore take swift and serious action to relieve local
resistance to the implementation of court-ordered desegregation plans.2 1 4 The
Eighth Circuit's holding in Liddell, that the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri may increase local taxes to pay for the St.
Louis desegregation plan, 21s will probably reduce delays and inconvenience to
the district court in the enforcement of school integration programs. Nevertheless, society and the courts must measure the price of avoiding delays and
inconvenience in terms of the constitutional protections secured through the
separation of powers. 216 Consequently, the Liddell court should have avoided
using the Supreme Court's mandate of Brown II for an expeditious remedy
to racial segregation in the public schools as a mandate to encroach upon
tax powers traditionally committed to the state legislatures. 2 7 The concept
of "all deliberate speed" 218 certainly never envisaged a federal court's exercise
of "all deliberate power" to achieve school desegregation.
DANIEL P. SHAVER

213. See Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968)
(federal court must strive to implement workable desegregation plan that starts school integration
process immediately).
214. See supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text (suggesting issuance of mandamus and
citation for contempt to compel local officials to expedite implementation of court-ordered
desegregation plan).
215. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1323.
216. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text (concept of separation of powers
prohibits federal court from dictating tax policies); see also Immigration and Naturalization
Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2788 (1983) (delays and inconvenience in achieving government
branch's objectives is not excuse for branch to exercise powers expressly reserved for coordinate
branch of government); cf. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 321 (1904)
(acknowledging federal court's difficulty in enforcing a money judgment against state because
of court's inability to compel state to levy taxes).
217. See Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 239 (1920) (state taxing powers vest in state
legislature); see also supra note 164 (cases holding that taxation is legislative function which
judicial branch may not exercise).
218. See Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kansas, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (federal
courts must ensure that local officials take actions to admit victims of segregation to public
schools on nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed).

